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he transition to a new system of deposit insurance is difficult enough during normal 
times, when ‘the veil of ignorance’ could ensure that there are no clear winners or 
losers. 
However, at the present juncture of the euro crisis, some banking systems or groups of banks 
clearly represent a higher risk than others. This makes the transition even more difficult.  We 
propose a gradual phasing in of both premia and protection, which should take care of this 
problem.   
Agreement on some underlying principles may be useful to guide the transition. We propose 
the following: 
  Keep total deposit insurance at €100,000 per depositor, as the existing Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Directive has adopted maximum harmonisation. 
  Build a target fund of 1.5% (as proposed by the European Commission and the European 
Parliament) of covered deposits gradually over a period of ten years. 
  Avoid double payment of premia by banks (national plus EU) to ensure neutral transition. 
  Avoid the need to harmonise national funds by letting them continue to operate in parallel. 
  Combine the functions of deposit insurance and resolution within one authority to keep 
things simple. 
  Construct  the  European  Deposit  Insurance  and  Resolution  Authority  (EDIRFA?)  as  a 
source of strength (‘credible’ fund) to foster confidence in the European banking system. 
Starting with the last principle, full coverage of all deposits in the banks that would fall under 
ECB supervision (labelled ‘European banks’
1) from day one is not feasible. But the end point 
also should be clear: a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund – as proposed by 
Schoenmaker  &  Gros,  2012  (http://www.ceps.eu/book/european-deposit-insurance-and-
resolution-fund) – run by a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) 
should become the authority that makes decisions on resolution and provides the payments to 
depositors when required. 
                                                   
1 A good compromise would be to put all the euro area banks subject to EBA stress tests under the 
new system. This criterion would imply a very high coverage in the countries under financial stress. 
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In  more concrete terms, we propose that the protection offered by the EDIRA  should  be 
phased in the following way: 
  In the first year, the EDIRA will guarantee only €5,000 per depositor. This amount could 
then  be  increased  each  year  by  the  same  amount  until,  after  20  years,  the  European 
protection scheme insures the full €100,000 per depositor. It would of course be possible 
to accelerate the transition by increasing the amount added to the European scheme by 
more than €5,000 per year. For example, with €10,000 the transition would take only ten 
years. But as our concern is to show how a phasing-in could work, rather than the precise 
amount, we will continue with the example of €5,000. 
  The coverage of the national deposit guarantee schemes will be reduced by the amounts 
guaranteed at the European level. Following the first principle, that would keep the total 
coverage at €100,000. The risk for the national guarantee schemes would of course go 
down as the European guarantee increases in size. The national schemes would lose their 
raison d’être over time, but in order to diminish their opposition to the new EU-level 
system, they should be left alone, rather than threatening them with immediate extinction. 
  Contributions by the ‘European Banks’ to EDIRA should of course be phased in as well. 
Although a totally neutral scheme might reduce opposition, we sketch a slightly quicker 
phasing-in of the contributions, which may be useful given the weak state of the banking 
system almost everywhere in the euro area. The premium for the European fund for the 
first year should be set at 0.0075% of insured deposits (5% of the 0.15% required to build 
up the 1.5% of deposits over ten years); for the second year at 0.015%, etc.
2 
  Contributions to national schemes would be reduced correspondingly for the ‘European 
banks’, which might then pay only 95% of the national premium. 
  After 20 years in the case of a €5,000 increment per year (or ten years with a €10,000 
annual  increment), the  full  coverage  for  the  European  banks  will  be  provided  by  the 
European  fund.  In  our  example  EDIRA  would  have  collected  about  0.8% of  covered 
deposits in premiums after ten years. Because of the gradual phasing in, it will then take 
another five years to reach the target of 1.5% of covered bonds.
3 
  Accumulated  contributions  of  the  European  banks  left  in  the  national  funds  after  the 
transition  period  can  be  transferred  to  the  EDIRA,  which  would  then  provide  a 
proportional discount on any premia from the banks from these countries. 
During  the  transition,  European  banks  in  countries  without  an  ex  ante  fund,  like  the 
Netherlands, would gradually reduce their liability to the national fund in steps. After four 
years, for example, a European bank would only contribute 80% to a local failure, while the 
national banks would contribute the full 100%. 
Once their contributions to the European fund are above a certain level, the European banks 
may find strong ECB supervision useful to reduce their potential liabilities. If that were to 
happen, the new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority would truly act as a 
source of strength for the banking system. 
                                                   
2 For the sake of simplicity, we refer here only to the average premium.  Actual premia of individual 
banks could of course be higher or lower, depending on the risk characteristics of the institution. 
3 The calculations get more complicated if a national fund already exists, so that national premia can 
be lowered. An example may clarify this proposal. A national fund applies a 25% discount on its 
premium. The European bank based in that country would pay 75% of the national premium for 
€95,000 coverage to the national fund in the first year. The national fund transfers 25% of the fee for 
the €5,000 coverage to the EDIRA. The relevant banks pay the European fund the fair premium (as 
calculated above) minus the discount for the national fund transfer (assuming that premiums are not 
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A final question is how to deal with legacy problems at some of the banks, which have bad 
assets and are weakly capitalised. It is important that deposit insurance and resolution are 
enacted at the same time. Some weak banks may need to be resolved (partly wound down 
and/or recapitalized) before they enter the new European supervisory and resolution regime to 
avoid large contingent liabilities. Countries then would have to deal with any legacy problems 
of their own weak banks. If needed, countries (like Greece, Portugal and Spain) could apply 
for support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
Only well-capitalised banks should enter the new European system of supervision by the ECB 
and resolution by EDIRA. After handling the legacy problems, these sound European banks 
can make a proper start in the Banking Union. 
 